This paper considers the role of intellectual property rights in the development of and access to new pharmaceuticals. A number of studies have found patents are significantly more important to pharmaceutical firms in appropriating the benefits from innovation compared to other high tech industries. The reason for this is because the costs of drug innovation are very high while the costs of imitation are relatively low. Hence the industry is subject to significant free rider problems. The paper discusses the economics of the innovative process and considers how patent policies have evolved in response to these characteristics in several developed countries with research intensive drug firms.
I. Introduction
As Roy Levy and Abraham Wickelgren of the Federal Trade Commission observe in a recent article "It is hard to think of many industries that have contributed as much to human welfare as the pharmaceutical industry. The importance of the industry make the job of competition authorities that much more difficult and important." There is accumulating empirical evidence that new drug introductions have indeed played a central role in increased longevity, enhanced quality of life and improved labor force participation and productivity. A number of benefit-cost analyses using very different data sets and methodologies have found that there are typically large positive externalities and net social benefits from drug innovation. 2 In a recent survey, Cutler and MacClellan conclude "in most of the cases we analyzed, technological innovations in medicine are on net positive. Technology often leads to more spending, but outcomes improve by even more". 3 It has also been shown in the literature that public policy actions can have a strong effect on the rate of technological progress in this industry. 4 The focus of this paper is on the role of intellectual property rights and patents in the development of and access to new pharmaceuticals. The next section discusses why patents are a more critical stimulus factor for pharmaceutical innovation compared with their impacts in other high-tech industries. Section III considers the evidence on this point emerging from the international experiences of countries that have implemented very different patent policies with respect to pharmaceuticals. The final section considers the special case of developing countries, where patent protection of pharmaceuticals has received increased attention in recent years with the expanding global AIDS crises and the enactment of TRIPS.
II. The Importance of Patents for Pharmaceutical Innovation
The importance of patents to pharmaceutical innovation has been demonstrated in several studies by economists. Richard Levin, et al, and Wes Cohen, et al, have undertaken surveys of U.S. R&D managers in a large cross-section of industries to identify which factors are most important and necessary in appropriating the benefits from innovations. 5 These factors included the competitive advantages of being first in the market, superior sales and service efforts, secrecy and complexity of production and product technology, as well as patents. Both studies found that the pharmaceutical industry placed the highest importance on patents. By contrast, many other researchintensive industries, such as computers and semiconductors, placed greater stress on factors like lead-time and learning by doing efficiencies in production accruing to first movers.
The findings of these studies are in accordance with an earlier study performed by This includes money spent in the discovery, pre-clinical and clinical phases as well as an allocation for the cost of failures. R&D costs were shown to have increased at an annual rate of 7.4% above general inflation when compared to the costs of 1980s introductions.
A major factor driving this increase is the current size and number of clinical trials, which have increased significantly in the 1990s compared to the earlier period.
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By contrast, the development costs of generic compounds are relatively modest.
In the United States, and most other countries, generic compounds must only show that they are bio-equivalent to the pioneering brand to receive market registration. This process only takes a few years and costs one to two million dollars. 11 The probability of success is also very high, as reflected by the fact that many generic firms typically receive FDA approval and enter the market within a short time window around patent expiration of the pioneer brand.
Effective patent life, defined as the patent time remaining at the time of product launch, is important from an economic incentive standpoint to innovators. This is because it takes many years for firms to recoup the high costs involved in drug R&D and 9 When R&D costs are capitalized to the date of market launch at an 11 percent discount rate, capitalized R&D costs are equal to $802 million. Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen and Henry G. percent relative to the originating brand, and had captured a total market share of 64 percent. 15 More recent time cohorts were characterized by even more intensive generic competition.
In summary, competition in pharmaceuticals centers around the introduction of new molecular entities as well as imitative drug therapies. The family of medicines in a given therapeutic class passes through a well delineated life cycle. There is dynamic competition involving breakthrough, as well as incremental advances, among branded products within a given class. This dynamic competition, in turn, produces substantial consumer surplus and social returns as discussed in Section I. When the patents for established products expire, consumers also benefit from imitative competition from generic entrants, which provide social benefits in terms of significantly lower prices.
The patent system is the public policy instrument designed to balance the tradeoffs inherent between these dynamic and generic forms of competition. Without a well structured system of patent protection, neither the research pharmaceutical industry nor the generic industry would be able to grow and prosper, as the rate of new product introductions and patent expirations would decline significantly.
III. International Comparative Studies
Insights on the importance of patent protection in pharmaceuticals also can be Japan provides an interesting case study. Until 1976, patent protection for pharmaceuticals was relatively weak. Only process protection was available. Their system did not encourage investment into real innovation. Instead, the energies of Japanese firms were primarily devoted to copying new drug innovation from abroad for sale within Japan. There was no development of an innovative industry and limited export potential associated with this system.
In 1976, Japan decided that it was in its long-term interests to change these policies.
In that year, the patent system was amended to allow full product patent protection for terms of 15 years. In the two decades since the change, Japan has emerged as one of the leading areas of international R&D activity in pharmaceuticals. The Japanese industry has evolved from an imitative entity to an innovative one.
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Canada is another country that has changed in its patent laws. The Canadian system historically featured a compulsory licensing approach to drug patents. This strongly 16 The data for figure 1 were compiled from US FDA Overall the strong association between patent protection and R&D investment suggests an interactive dynamic process is at work. In particular, countries that wish to 18 Compulsory licensing in Canada was replaced with a system of drug pricing controls administered by the Canadian Patented Medicine Review Board. encourage R&D investment and innovation have industrial policies that feature strong patent protection policies. These policies in turn play an important role in incentivizing firms in industries like pharmaceuticals and biotechnology to undertake the long costly and risky investments that characterize the innovative process in these industries.
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IV. Pharmaceutical Patents and Developing Countries
A. Barriers to Innovation and Access
The patent system has played a critical role in incentivizing R&D investments for global diseases like AIDS, cardiovascular illnesses and cancer. At the same time, relatively little public or privately supported R&D investment is currently directed to diseases specific to developing countries such as malaria, tuberculosis and schistosomiasis, even though these diseases currently afflict millions of individuals. This lack of strong interest is illustrated by the fact that only 13 of the more than 12,000 new drugs introduced globally, between 1975 and 1997, were specifically directed to tropical diseases. 22 The basic problem, from a return on investment perspective, is the low income and low expected potential sales in developing country markets. The problem is compounded by the lack of patent protection in many developing countries, the fact that developing countries devote as little as $2 per capita per year on health, and the reluctance of developed nations to come to their aid. many of the drug manufacturers have agreed to provide their medicines at cost, and some now provide their products without charge as charitable donations to these countries.
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The provision of products at cost or below cost raises other trade-related issues.
One of the major issues from the standpoint of the companies is the possibility that these products will be pirated and illegally diverted to high income countries where they can be sold at the higher prices prevalent in these countries. Parallel exportation of drugs from low to high income countries could undermine the willingness of pharmaceutical firms to continue to provide these products at low prices, since this kind of arbitrage would adversely affect the return on their investment in major markets. 26 If parallel exportation becomes a serious problem, an international agreement barring parallel exports from developing countries to high income countries may be necessary to avoid these adverse consequences. Such an international agreement would serve patient interests in developing countries.
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In most cases, even the marginal costs of most AIDS drugs, whether supplied by large pharmaceutical firms or generic entities, far exceed the total per capita health expenditures of these countries. 28 Hence charity and donations from many sourcesincluding foreign governments, nonprofit foundations and corporate entities -will be essential if the global community is to deal effectively with this and other epidemics. kind donations to developing countries and this is something that should be encouraged as part of the overall solution to this crisis.
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Under current US tax law, firms can deduct charitable donations on their corporate income tax and thus recover part of the costs associated with donating the products. 31 They also receive corporate goodwill from such donations. As the tax laws are currently constructed, U.S. firms cannot deduct more than twice their inventory cost of donated product. In a recent paper commissioned for the World Health Organization, Scherer and Watal show that the incentives for firms to undertake these donations of product could be increased if U.S. tax laws were re-interpreted or modified to impose no net cost on the donor. 32 In this case the burden would be shifted to the U.S. taxpayers.
Some would argue that if this is to be done, it should be done directly as part of American foreign aid policy rather than indirectly through tax incentives. As a response to this argument, Scherer and Watal contend that "charity through non-transparent tax expenditures is often more feasible politically than outright governmental gifts and grants. It should be aggressively exploited as a means of increasing the supply of lifesaving drugs to the world's poor." While access to patented medicines in less affluent nations presents many thorny policy issues, the more long-run and to-date intractable problem involves the need for greater R&D investment and drug innovation devoted to diseases endemic to these countries. These diseases have no viable markets in more affluent countries to spur such investment efforts. The remainder of this paper is devoted to a discussion of this issue.
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B. Encouraging Drug Innovation for Third World Diseases
From an economic incentives perspective, the problem of developing medicines for tropical diseases like malaria and tuberculosis is similar in nature to the "orphan drug"
problem concerning new medicines for rare illnesses. In both cases, there are inadequate incentives for companies to bear the high costs and risks of new drug development. In the case of orphan drugs, the problem was similar: small numbers of patients afflicted with rare diseases like Wilson's disease or Huntington's disease made R&D that might help those patients uneconomical. In the case of diseases endemic to developing countries, a mirror-image problem exists: a lack of economic resources resulting from low per capita health spending discourages research, even though in this case the number of patients is enormous. One could thus categorize these tropical diseases as "orphan diseases" even though the afflicted patient populations are very large. In 1983, Congress passed the Orphan Drug Act, which provided a variety of incentives to undertake R&D on orphan drug indications (defined in a subsequent law as diseases or medical conditions which affect less than 200,000 patients). 37 The economic incentives included in the Act involved R&D tax credits, a clinical research grants program, accelerated reviews at the FDA and a guaranteed market exclusivity period of 7 years from the date of FDA approval (this was separate from any normal patent protection that might also apply to these products). Funding for R&D has also been provided by various non-profit foundations focused on particular rare illnesses.
The effect of these incentives on the development of new orphan drug has been impressive. In the period between 1983 and 1999, more than 200 drugs and biologicals for rare diseases have been introduced. 38 This represents more than a twelve-fold annual increase compared to the decade prior to the enactment of the law, when fewer than ten such products came to the market for the entire 10 year period. In a recent paper,
Professor Frank Lichtenberg has shown that the Act has had a favorable effect on mortality from rare illnesses. While the number of deaths from rare diseases had been increasing faster than those from other diseases in the 5-year period prior to 1983, the number of deaths from rare diseases declined, both in absolute terms and relative to other deaths, in the post-1983 period.
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To attack the "orphan disease" problem confronting third world countries for diseases like malaria and leprosy, one needs an international counterpart to the U.S.
Orphan Drug Act. From a scientific standpoint, the time is ripe, given the recent advances in genomics which enhance the possibility of developing significant new vaccines and therapies for infectious diseases prevalent in less affluent countries. As in the case of the Orphan Drug Act, a multifaceted approach is necessary including R&D subsidies to firms with promising new technologies. These could be funded through government as well as non-profit charitable entities and public-private partnerships.
Given the low income base of third world markets, success of these programs might well hinge upon guarantees to purchase economically sustainable amounts of products that are successfully developed. The purchase agreements could be tied to up-front commitments from the firms on the product's price within third world markets. Michael Kremer has characterized R&D incentive programs based on purchase guarantees as "pull" programs 
